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This study attempts to broaden our horizons in understanding whether there are any 
actual value creators among the multiple dimensions which compose the rating in ESG 
performance. Extant literature presents contradictory findings and questions the 
direction of the causality of the positive association between firm value and CSR 
performance. While other researchers focus basically on one dimension of CSR, namely 
the environment, we embrace a more aggregate approach and explore multiple 
dimensions concerning the corporate social governance performance of a company. 
Furthermore, this is the first study to our knowledge that examines whether there is a 
relation between the effective tax rate and the environmental, social, or financial 
performance.  
I provide an empirical analysis to corroborate my research by utilizing a sample of 1.429 
firm-year observations of European corporations and by employing a linear-price model 
that correlates the market value of equity and the different aspects of ESG combined 
score. The findings of this study support that ESG performance has market valuation 
implications, while some ESG dimensions are more statistically significant than others. 
In addition, descriptive statistics evidence that energy-intensive industries, which are 
more strictly regulated, are more incentivized and perform better in particular ESG 
areas, such as resources use, emissions management, community impact and workforce 
safety and advancement.    
I owe a great debt of gratitude to my supervisor Dr. Alexandros Sikalidis for his guidance 
and his valuable comments on earlier versions of this study. This study would not have 
been completed without his contribution. Remaining errors are my own. Also, I am 
thankful to Joanna Katrantzis for her advice and assistance in polishing this manuscript. 
Finally, I am deeply grateful to my husband, Iakovos Theodoulidis, whose continuous 
encouragement and support were vital for the completion of this dissertation.  
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Reporting in companies has been reconsidered after emerging of new concepts, 
Sustainability and Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR). Investor analysts seem to be in 
favour of companies that promote engaging in CSR investments and adopt integrating 
reporting. There are many frameworks towards which companies may report publicly 
their economic, environmental, and social impacts.  
We are witnessing a worldwide wave of reforms, where EU1, OECD, UN PRI, GRI drive 
the evolution of taxation and sustainability reporting. The global business landscape is 
changing drastically due to external forces, such as the elimination of resources, the 
energy transition, the future demographics (resulting in an ageing workforce), the 
internet of things, the planet under pressure (UN Global Compact, 2019). These mega-
trends are inevitably formulating the business environment into sustainability terms. 
Across the European continent, companies are witnesses of impacts triggered by climate 
change, scarce resources, geopolitics, evolution of digital technologies (such as AI2, 
robotics).   
 The forerunner of sustainability reports was the environmental report, which was 
first published in the late 1980s by chemical companies. By the time ethical investing 
became a new trend, tobacco corporations were keen on adopting non-financial 
reporting. During the past two decades, the propensity prevails in many organizations 
to prepare a sustainability report in an annual basis. Corporate Sustainability Reporting 
(CSR) has its roots in the “Triple Bottom Line”, whose main pillars appear to be the 
economic, environmental, and social. A true sustainability report would consider the 
impacts on future generations, so it would be referred to the firm’s performance in 
respect of its interaction with the physical and social environment, including all kind of 
firm’s stakeholders.        
Since 2001, European Commission recommended the disclosure of environmental 
issues in annual reports for all companies under 4th and 7th Company Law Directives 
(78/660/EEC, 83/349/EEC) to enhance comparability and transparency (EU, 2001). 
 
1 EU Non-Financial Reporting Directive 2014/95/EU (Directive) 
2 AI - Artificial Intelligence 
[2] 
 
European Survey of Corporate Social Responsibility Reporting in 2018 (P&R Square and 
Erik van Buuren, 2018) researched the level of non-financial reporting among 341 largest 
firms from 9 European Indices3 and concluded that 96% of them issue CSR reports. This 
is the result of the introduction of new government reporting regulation and stock 
exchanges fillings conditions, regardless the voluntary character of reporting. 
Surprisingly, 58% of the sample managed to reflect their corporate responsibility 
performance into the UN Sustainability Development Goals (SDGs), despite the short 
notice since the UN’s framework was launched.  
Energy sector, utilities at large, consumer staples and materials sector comprise of 
firms that have realized the importance of transparent reporting in value creation for 
the stakeholders and thus, have become the leaders embracing CSR reporting (P&R 
Square and Erik van Buuren, 2018). Climate change is the leading topic in sustainability 
agenda and therefore the energy sector ought to be a pioneer in non-financial reporting. 
These companies provide absolute data especially concerning GHG Emissions and 
energy use. Meaning that for a firm to be able to report is a precondition that it manages 
and measures effectively its resources. Moreover, according to GlobeScan (Europe CSR 
White Paper, 2019), the manufacturing sector is a fundamental pillar of the EU 
economy4, since EU is the world’s largest exporter of manufactured goods and a leader 
in respects of high-quality products. The recognition of the magnitude of the 
manufacturing sector in the EU creates a major impact worldwide. Thus, it is crucial for 
European companies to transit into sustainable growth in a faster pace – and basically 
de-carbonize their operations. On the contrary, Information Technology, Financials and 
Real Estate sectors comprise of firms that provide less publicly available information.    
The business world struggles to make the connection between their activities and 
SDGs. The focus on short-termism regarding value creation for shareholders may be a 
cause that justifies such deviation. A key to overleap this gap would be the interpretation 
of SDGs into actual business opportunities that would enhance value in companies 
 
3 FTSE (UK), CAC (France), DAX (Germany), MIB (Italy), IBEX (Spain), AEX (Netherlands), BEL (Belgium), 
PSI (Portugal), SMI (Switzerland) 
4 Manufacturing sector in EU is representing 22,1 % of employment. It is estimated that 1 out of 11 
companies in EU were manufacturing companies in 2014 (data retrieved from GlobeScan 2019)  
[3] 
 
(GlobeScan, 2019). In other words, it is the notion of Balance Score Card5 (BSC). Balanced 
scorecard has been characterized from its opponents as the managerial equivalent of 
Stakeholder theory (Jensen M., 2001). 21st century companies’ most valuable assets are 
basically the intangibles. If companies fail to measure their most important assets, they 
are probably not managing them that well. That is the motivation for implementing BSC, 
which is another proof that non-financial information needs to be considered and 
reported. In many cases, we may not be able to translate everything into financial terms, 
but we can possibly quantify them.  
BSC aims to overcome the limitations of other management tools that focus only to 
financial measures. Financial statements depict the fair performance of the company, 
but they are based on past events. Tangible and financial assets could be measured using 
other tools. However, the same tools shall not be applied for the intangibles. If we 
cannot measure something, we cannot value it. However, there are prior studies 
criticizing the objective of BSC and whether it is indeed applicable. According to BSC 
managers would measure and report four perspectives: customer, internal process, 
financial, and innovation/ learning. 
One major flaw of the Balanced scorecard is that it is not a single dimensional 
measurement of managers’ performance or in other words, the existence of a single-
valued objective. Based on Jensen’s view, it is impossible to maximize simultaneously 
more than one dimension, because targeting increasing one dimension will occur at the 
expense of another one. Managers should make trade-offs between conflicting 
interests. They should be encouraged to maximize one aggregate score which would be 
linked to their contribution to the firm. Only the process of creating the BSC might add 
value by locating the value-drivers. Jensen ends up that BSC serves other purposes than 
evaluating performance. Jensen M. (2001) agrees with the originators of BSC in two 
points. First, BSC is a tool which assists managers to pinpoint the value creators in firm. 
Second, it teaches them how to manage those value drivers. However, the challenge for 
them is to specify the trade-offs among the multiple dimensions of performance to avoid 
conflicts, confusion and lack of focus. Lastly, Jensen M. (2001) concludes that the term 
 
5 In the early 90s, the Balanced Scorecard (BSC) was initially introduced as a management tool for profit 
organizations by R.S. Kaplan and D.P. Norton (Kaplan, Norton 1992). 
[4] 
 
“balance” should be replaced with the term “organizational scoreband”, as it better 
describes something that gives a score. 
Managers might be sceptical on BSC, but they are fond of Stakeholder theory for 
plenty of reasons. They have personal short-term interests, they pursue their own goals 
at the expense of shareholders and lastly, without specific criteria cannot be evaluated 
for their performance. Therefore, stakeholder theory increases agency costs by 
expanding the authority of executives and cancels the firm’s internal control systems. 
Friedrich von Hayek stresses that there is a human psyche approach which explains why 
people are attracted by Stakeholder theory. It is due to people’s inherited evolutionary 
attachment to the small group (family), participation in micro-cosmos and macro-
cosmos, as well as people’s innate sense of altruism and solidarity. Nevertheless, no 
stakeholder would ever be fully satisfied if it is for the firm to survive.  
It is impressive the fact that among the largest economies worldwide, we spot also 
MNEs instead of just countries. Thus, this study examines the behaviour of those 
corporations towards the corporate governance laws and regulations and towards the 
CSR voluntary guidelines. CSR/ Sustainability/ Non-financial reporting is supposed to 
take place to mediate the different interests and demands of various stakeholders and 
to ensure transparent information disclosure. 
Do CSR mechanisms, create value and increase company’s performance? Good 
Corporate Governance (CG) should protect stakeholders’ rights meaning that CG is 
dealing with the agency problem – how to assure financiers that they get a return on 
their financial investment (Shleifer and Vishny, 1997). Consequently, corporations with 
good CG in consecutive years would eventually increase their value. According to 
Deminor Rating (Amsterdam, 2003) firms in Europe with “good governance” earned 3% 
more profit. Moreover, board diversity appears to pay off, since firms (market cap more 
than $10b) with at least one woman on the board outperformed their peers by an 
average 5% (Credit Suisse Group, 2015). 
The structure of this study unfolds as follows: Beginning with the literature review 
which outlines the main contradictory applied theories, continuing with the hypotheses’ 
development and data analysis. The upcoming section provides the empirical results in 
accordance with the literature discussed previously. Lastly, the theoretical and practical 
issues are raised in the conclusions part, alongside with the limitations facing this study.  
[5] 
 
2. Literature Review and Hypothesis Development 
2.1 Basic concepts and prior studies analyzing them 
2.1.1 CSR initiatives are reckoned as firm-value creator or firm-value destroyer? 
Many researchers, scholars, analysts beg the question of whether corporate 
sustainability performance enhances the financial performance of an organization. 
There is a vivid debate with worthwhile arguments from both sides. However, the results 
to date are inconclusive.  
Extant studies question the actual impact of CSR investments in the financial 
performance of a firm. Post and Waddock (1995) in an effort to convince those 
wondering how it is possible by spending resources without gaining anything tangible in 
return to create wealth; they stress out that intangible assets (positive moral capital, 
goodwill), also, have value. Rindova and Fombrum (1998) pinpoint that although 
reputation per se has no value in pecuniary terms, reputational capital because of CSR 
initiatives has economic value, since these actions potentially enhance shareholders’ 
wealth.  
For decades, the main purpose of a corporation was to maximize returns to 
shareholders. As mentioned by Friedman M. in 1962, “In free economy, there is only 
one social responsibility of business, to use its resources and engage in activities to 
increase its profits as long as it stays within the rules of the group”. Later, Friedman 
(1970) in the New York Times Management suggested that CSR investments may be 
regarded as an irresponsible way of using corporate resources. Other researchers 
supported that they assumed CSR expenditures as “doing well by doing good” 
(Fombrum, 2005; Servaes & Tamayo, 2013). Campbell (2007) posits that it is deterrent 
for the firms to act in a socially responsible way while there is the imperative of wealth 
maximization. In recent years, there are still economists that express their scepticism 
about CSR initiatives. Analysing the cost and benefits of undertaking a CSR investment 
project by applying the traditional financial NPV (Net Present Value), usually indicates 
to reject it (McWilliams and Siegel, 2001). NPV method fails to take into consideration 
the value of flexibility for strategic reasons created by certain investments. Albasteki et 
[6] 
 
al. (2019) is referred to the Exxon Valdez incident6 to support the value of flexibility. 
Specifically, Exxon saved the cost of CSR investment, but lost the flexibility to respond in 
a company’s dramatic failure and lost more than $8 billion (penalties, liability, 
reputation damage). Failure to contribute to the goal of shareholders’ maximization 
value. 
2.1.2 Stakeholder theory versus Shareholders value maximization theory  
Freeman R.E. and Velamuni R. introduced the “Stakeholder theory7” through an 
article titled “New approaches to CSR” in 1984. That new philosophy aimed to 
equilibrate the pursuit of wealth with a commitment to ethical values. Deng et al. (2013) 
separated the two opposing perspectives: the stakeholder value maximization view, and 
the shareholder expense view. The shareholder expense view proposes that executives 
engage in CSR activities to satisfy the needs of other stakeholders in the expense of 
shareholders (New York Times Magazine, 1970; Friedman, 1970; Pagano & Volpin, 2005; 
Cronqvist et. al, 2009). Jensen opposes Stakeholder theory and presumes that it leaves 
managers empowered to spend resources, while they bear the credits and shareholders 
bear only the costs. The overinvestment view propose that CSR expenses aim to 
intensify managers’ reputation and could be an example of an agency cost of equity. 
Overinvestment in CSR might, as well, satisfy the demands of shareholders that are 
willing to do some societal good. Friedman (1962) posited that “philanthropic agent” is 
an insufficient means of charity and better delegated to individual shareholders rather 
than corporations. The overinvestment view is deemed as an alternative of agency 
theory.  
Corporations ought to disclose information that assist different stakeholders with 
conflict of interest, to engage with firm’s decision-making process; but, simultaneously 
without conveying commercially sensitive information. Managers are reluctant in 
sharing information deemed as too confidential that could trigger the competitors. By 
employing the term “investor capitalism”, Zajac et al. (2004) referred to a model of 
 
6 The Exxon Valdez oil spill triggered in Alaska (1989) when Exxon Valdez, an oil tanker struck Prince 
William Sound's Bligh Reef, which resulted in huge damage to the marine environment. 
7 Stakeholders defined as “any identifiable group or individual who can affect the achievement of an 




economic allocation of resources. While managers engage with CSR investments, 
considerable agency costs are incurred. The “investor capitalism” model propose the 
capital allocation to be assumed by investors. According to Atkinson and Galaskiewicz 
(1988) firms with low levels of CEO ownership are more generous in charitable giving. 
From another perspective, managers would increase disclosure. Inevitably, there is a 
risk information gap as correctly was noted by the ICAEW8. 
Legitimacy theory could explain why entities choose to make voluntary disclosures. 
It supports that companies have the tendency to legitimize their activities through 
disclosures (CSR reports, environmental reports, additional non-compulsory) to 
manipulate the firm’s relations with society (Cho & Patten, 2007).   
Several studies conducted on dividends, presume that dividend changes are depicted 
in the future cash flows of the firm (John and Williams, 1985). Basically, dividend policy 
signals manager’s confidence. In accounting, dividends represent the most 
characteristic form of signalling theory. Based on Verrecchia’s view (2001), firms that 
aim to signal a “good corporate citizens” profile will increase disclosure. Gunawardena 
et al. (2019), through their theoretical study, invoked that corporate reputation affects 
subsequent financial performance of firms, since corporate reputation signals 
trustworthiness of a firm. This encloses a psychological assessment, based on totally 
subjective assessments of experiences, and a priori signals. Signalling theory aims to 
eliminate information asymmetry between the insiders and outsiders of a firm. As 
accurately stated by Afzal et al. (2008), when different parties of a transaction have 
different intel, information asymmetry exists. Differentiation of individuals in respect of 
ownership and control inevitably leads to information asymmetry between executives 
and shareholders (Francis J., 1995). In signalling theory, the fundamental elements are 
the signaller (insider, manager), the receiver and the signal itself (mainly insights that 
convey positive messages). According to Connelly et al. (2011) signals may be 
categorized9 as intent signals, camouflage signals and need signals. A remedy for 
eliminating information asymmetry would be disclosing more as a means of increased 
transparency between the insiders (firm) and the outsiders (stakeholders). Then 
 
8 ICAEW – Institute of Charted Accountants of England and Wales 
9 Intent signals- indicate future actions that are crucial for receiver’s actions; camouflage signals- conceal 
contingent liability; need signals- communicate requirements (Connelly et al., 2011) 
[8] 
 
investors would be informed for future costs that might be occurred. However, 
managing and measuring emissions must be done beforehand and it is made at the 
expense of shareholders. Another example is the signalling theory of covenants where 
the acceptance of stricter covenants is a signal of strong future performance (Demiroglu 
and James, 2010). 
According to “rational economic man” theory, all individuals’ actions are driven by 
self-interest and thus, it is rational that managers will act in a manner to increase their 
wealth. In previous decades, corporate governance failure and earnings management 
led to major scandals (e.g. Enron, Parma, WorldCom). Xie et al. (2003) analysed the role 
of sub-committees and especially the presence of an audit committee and its 
composition and concluded that companies with accounting errors omitted to have 
internal control in the sense of an audit committee. 
Based on the agency theory, there is an inherent conflict between the interests of the 
principals and the agents. Managers might not present fairly the financial statements of 
the company for self-interest purposes. Furthermore, this situation creates information 
asymmetry which leads investors to non-optimal investment decisions (Kothari et al., 
2016).  
Political economy theory introduces the Legitimacy-Stakeholder theory. Legitimacy 
theory promotes that disclosures (such as CSR reports, environmental reports, or other 
non-compulsory disclosures) are used for strategic reasons by the firms to gain public 
acceptance and to align with community expectations (empirical studies of Patten, 
1992; Brown and Deegan; 1998). On the other side, Stakeholder theory should not be 
reckoned as a separate theory but as a different perspective within the political-
economy framework. Basically, explains that managers shall provide more detailed 
information to stakeholders to eliminate the risk of being dismissed, so earnings 
management actions are less possible to take place. 
2.1.3 Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) – Corporate Citizenship 
CSR is controversial in the sense that it has a wide variety of definitions due to the 
multiple interests of a broader group of stakeholders represented. “Being socially 
responsible means not only fulfilling legal expectations, but also going beyond 
compliance and investing more into human capital, the environment and the relations 
[9] 
 
with stakeholders” (European Commission, 2001: Promoting a European Framework for 
Corporate Social Responsibility). Hill et al. (2007) define CSR as the economic, legal, 
moral, and philanthropic actions of firms that influence the quality of life of relevant 
stakeholders. The definition given by the World Bank Council for Sustainable 
Development is “the continuing commitment by business to behave ethically and 
contribute to economic development while improving the quality of life of the workforce 
and their families as well as of the local community and society at large”. 
2.1.4 CSR Sustainability Reporting: moving from voluntary to mandatory Disclosure 
First attempt of voluntary sustainability reporting dates to the decades 1960s and 
1970s. The Netherlands and France were among the pioneer countries of voluntary 
social disclosures. “Social and ethical performance” was driving the ethical investment 
funds in the U.S. and UK during the 1980s.  
An environmental disaster (Exxon Valdez, 1989) triggered the development of the 
“CERES10/ Valdez Principles” which was comprised of a set of guidelines focus on 
environmental issues. Public outcry over the environmental damage of the Exxon Valdez 
oil spill incentivized as well as the establishment of GRI. In 1997, the Global Reporting 
Initiative (GRI) was founded by the United Nations Environment Program (UNEP) and 
the CERES as a response to the public outcry for the urgency for corporate transparency. 
In 2000, the first version of GRI Guidelines was launched which provided the first global 
framework for sustainability reporting. It was eventually integrated in 2016 into the GRI 
Sustainability Reporting Standards.  
In the meantime, the United Nations Conference on Sustainable Development 
(known as “Rio+20”) took place in Rio, 2012. The conference resulted in a political 
document under the name “Future We Want-Outcome document11”, which includes 
measures and guidance of implementing sustainable development. 
 
10 CERES – Coalition for Environmentally Responsible Economies. Ceres’ mission is building a sustainable 
future for people and for the planet while transforming the economy. Today, “Ceres Investor Network” 
comprise of more than 175 institutional investors, managing over $29 trillion in assets. Examples of Ceres’ 
initiatives are the “Global Investor Coalition on Climate Change”, “Climate Action 100+” and “The Investor 
Agenda”. (https://www.ceres.org 2020) 




The Great Recession of 2007-2009 along with all corporate scandals increased 
insecurity, lack of trust and sectors even self-regulated. According to Ioannou and 
Serafeim (2015), more intensive sustainability reporting was requested as investors in 
capital markets esteemed ESG data into their valuation models.   
By the mid-2000s, a new phrase substitutes the term “CSR”, which was under the 
label “corporate sustainability”. Meaning that companies ought to be sustainable in a 
sense that they are prospering within a healthy environment and society. Sustainability 
reporting is not only the provision to a range of stakeholders of information about the 
performance of an entity.  But also, how the entity interacts with its physical and social 
environment, including information in terms of workforce, local and overseas 
communities, and use of natural resources. Social reporting and environmental 
reporting are components of sustainability reporting. Sustainable development has best 
described in Brundtland Report (1987), “Ensuring the needs of today’s world are met 
while at the same time ensuring that the ability for future generations to meet their own 
needs is not compromised.” 
2.1.5 Corporate Governance (CG) and the UK CG Code  
According to the definition provided by UK CG Code (2012) “Corporate governance is 
the system by which companies are directed and controlled”.   
In July 2018, FRC12 published the revised “UK Corporate Governance Code”, whose 
goal was to enhance the importance of non-financial reporting with matters that impact 
the long-term company’s performance. The set of Principles in the Code emphasizes the 
importance of implementing CG13 practices that promote long-term sustainable success. 
The 2018 Guidance focuses in 5 main pillars of CG; Board Leadership and Company 
Purpose; Division of Responsibilities; Composition, Succession and Evaluation; Audit, 
Risk, and Internal Control; Remuneration. Each pillar comes along with principles and 
provisions.  
 
12 FRC – Financial Reporting Council 
13 CG – Corporate Governance 
[11] 
 
2.1.6 Risk Management, Socially Responsible Investment (SRI) & Socially Responsible 
Corporate Behavior 
Based on Albasteki et al. (2019) views, the environmental risk and social risk led to 
the emergence of CSR. More and more organizations felt the pressure to align with the 
concept of “triple bottom line” (social, environmental, economic) or “3Ps” (people, 
planet, profit). Prior studies conclude that the higher the SCR performance of a firm, the 
lower the financial risk occurred (Orlitzky M. et al., 2001). Similarly, Bowman (1980) 
states that CSR assimilates business risk as the outcome of the new culture adopted, 
which averse any business threat.    
SRI movement gained advocates, especially in Europe. It rapidly evolved from the 
ethical view towards investments into engaging CSR ratings in analysts’ valuation 
models. In 2003, the UNEP Finance Initiative ratified an “agreement among analysts in 
which environmental, social, and corporate governance issues affect the long-term 
shareholder value”.   
Campbell (2007) realized that the definition of a socially responsible corporate 
behaviour would vary depending on the point of view of each stakeholder. For instance, 
employees reckon as a socially responsible corporation the one that cares about the 
health and safety of its workforce. So, the definition is adjustable based on the 
perspective of the stakeholders that is referred to. The CSR score might differ 
dramatically for different definitions. 
2.1.7 Evidence from prior studies  
Lys et al. (2015) strongly support that most of the literature wrongly assumed the 
direction of the causality of the positive association between CSR expenditures and 
future performance. The results of the empirical study demonstrate that the positive 
relation is more likely due to signalling of CSR expenditures. Their main argument was 
that when a firm assumes strong future financial performance, then it is more likely to 
invest in CSR initiatives. Management’s insight (e.g., private intel of a breakthrough) 
could impact the direction of the causality. Once more we witness the effect of 
information asymmetry. They examined 3 hypotheses regarding why firms would 




According to Campbell J. (2007), social responsibility of a firm may be affected by the 
general financial position of the firm, the economic circumstances in which firm 
operates, and the level of competition.  
Deng X. et al. (2013) evidenced that mergers with high CSR acquirers are completed 
in shorter periods and are less likely to fail.   
Gunawardena et al. (2019) summarized at least five factors that have been tested in 
association with a firm’s financial performance: corporate social responsibility (Cochran 
et al. 2014), social responsibility (Barnett at al., 2006), board composition (Dalton et al., 
1998), corporate social/environmental performance (Orlitzky et al., 2003), balanced 
scorecard implementation (Davis & Albright, 2004).  
Campbell J. (2007) provides a theoretical approach which specifies the conditions for 
a firm to behave in a socially responsible manner. This approach is the institutional 
theory of corporate social responsibility, when institutional mechanisms14 are in place 
may influence corporate behaviour that focuses on short-termism. 
Waddock and Graves (1997) provided a regression analysis with multidimensional 
gauge of CSR, which found a link with a positive sign between CSR and corporate 
financial performance.  
Results of prior empirical studies are inconsistent with the shareholder value 
maximization view, suggesting that firms satisfying plenty stakeholders’ interests, they 
are enhancing the long-term profitability and thus, maximizing the shareholders’ wealth 
(Deng X. et al., 2013).  
Jensen M. (2001) is one of the strongest opponents of Stakeholder theory, whose 
roots lies at sociology, organizational behaviour, politics of special interests and 
managerial self-interest view. Stakeholder theory best depicts the self-interest of 
managers, who become unaccountable for their decisions, because they take account 
of interests of all stakeholders. Moreover, according to Jensen “firm value” is not only 
the value of equity, but also the sum of values of every financial claim of the company 
including debt, contingent claims, and equity.      
Ghoul S. et al. (2011) after an empirical analysis using a large sample of 2.809 U.S. 
firms reached to three main conclusions. First, firms with better CSR scores demonstrate 
 
14 Institutional mechanisms, such as public and private regulation, presence of NGOs, organized dialogues 
among firms and stakeholders (Campbell J., 2016) 
[13] 
 
cheaper equity financing. Likewise, prior research denotes that effective corporate 
governance causes elimination of information asymmetry, thus become less risky for the 
investors and lower cost of equity (Botosan, 1997; Hail and Leuz, 2006; Chen et al., 
2009). Firms with better environmental performance, are realised higher bond yields 
and thus, having easier access to debt financing (Sharfman and Fernando, 2008). Cost of 
equity or internal rate of return depicts the market’s perception of firm’s riskiness and 
investors’ required rate of return on corporate investments. Second, CSR investments 
targeting improving employee relations, environmental performance, and product 
characteristics contribute to reducing firm’s cost of equity. Third, firms comprised in two 
particular “sin industries” (tobacco and nuclear power) face increased cost of equity. To 
summarize, these findings evidence that socially responsible behaviour prove to have 
lower risk and higher valuation.  
Goss A. and Roberts G. (2010) examined the effect of CSR on the cost of bank loans 
and found that lenders treat different firms based on theirs CSR strengths and concerns. 
Using a sample of 3.996 loans to U.S. firms, Goss et al. (2010) reached the conclusion 
that lenders incentivize firms to amend CSR concerns by postulating higher yield spreads 
to borrowers with worst CSR scores. In addition, lenders do not appreciate CSR 
initiatives that likely add no value – known as “greenwash”. Afterall, banks are primarily 
interested in the borrower’s ability to meet its loan liabilities. According to risk 
mitigation view, firms with higher CSR ratings, have lower idiosyncratic risk and thus, 
lower returns but, higher market to book value (Galema et al., 2008; Lee and Faff, 2009). 
So, when banks perceive less risk, they are willing to provide more attractive loan 
covenants to corporations with socially responsible behaviour. The presence of 
institutional shareholders equals with amplified monitoring which allows lower spreads 
(Roberts and Yuan, 2010). Goss et al. (2010) suggest that CSR concerns do matter and 
are priced by banks when they are composing the loan contract terms, the increased 
risk depicted with higher spreads.    
Liao et al. (2014) through their empirical study, examined 329 of the largest 
companies in the UK and concluded that there is significant positive association between 
gender diversity and disclosures of GHG emissions. Similarly, the existence of an 
environmental committee shows a propensity to be more transparent from an 
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ecological perspective. However, the board independence is not associated with the 
tendency of GHG disclosure.  
Multiple studies examine the firm’s performance under the scope of embracing CSR 
initiatives. The results of these studies are divisive, either CSR investments are reckoned 
as value enhancing or as value destroying.  
On a positive point of view, Feldman et al. (1997) formulates that investors perceive 
as less risky the firms that are environmentally more sensitive. It is not a surprise that 
expected returns for “sin” stocks are higher, due to increased litigation risk. Brammer S. 
et al. (2006) using a sample of 451 companies in the U.K. concluded that firms with 
higher social performance ratings are inclined to achieve lower returns. They used three 
measures of socially responsible behaviour: community, environmental and employee 
performance. The employee and environmental indicators are negatively associated 
with returns. It is noticeable that some industrial sectors care more about their 
environmental performance, due to the potential environmental impact (such as 
utilities and resources, power generation, chemicals). Others pay greater attention to 
their community performance, due to brand reputation being vital for their business. 
Among the worst performers appear to be information technology, general industrials, 
cyclical consumer goods sectors (Brammer et al., 2006). Brammer et al. conclude that 
CSR activities considered as paradigm in some sectors are deemed as wasteful in others.  
Research papers since 1994 evidence that capital markets employ environmental 
disclosure or “unbooked” liabilities to evaluate a firm’s risk profile (Blacconiere and 
Patten, 1994; Campbell et al., 1998).  
Voluntarily practices meliorating ESG behaviour might have a positive effect on firm 
value by attracting talented employees (Turban and Greening, 1997). Similarly, Guenster 
et al. finds a positive relationship between firm value and environmental performance. 
Another study reaches the conclusion that CSR and corporate financial performance are 
positively associated (Orlitzky et al., 2003).  
Margolis et al. (2007) perceived CSR as activities that might positively contribute 
towards firm’s earnings. Furthermore, there is a positive valuation impact on corporate 
social performance according to Jiao (2010). Based on Adams et al. (2010) corporate 
governance practices might have an impact on firm value.  
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On the other side, Hamilton et al. (1993) evidence that the excess returns of mutual 
funds characterized as “socially responsible” have no divergence compared with the 
conventional mutual funds. In addition, Brammer et al. (2006) find that firms with better 
social performance realize lower returns. It is important to note that the sample 
examined for the time span 2002-2003, where equity markets were misjudging CSR 
initiatives – CSR top performing firms were linked to negative abnormal returns, the 
exact opposite for bad-performers.  
No evidence that CSR engagements affect firm’s financial performance is the 
outcome of another study (Nelling and Webb, 2009). The negative effects on firm value 
might also occur due to compliance costs (e.g., Chow, 1983; Bushee and Leuz, 2005). 
Eccles et al. (2014) notably mentioned that preparation costs or revealing of 
competitively sensitive information within the framework of sustainability disclosure 
laws, might decrease firm value. The same study shows that sustainable corporations 
outperform their peers with lower sustainability profiles.   
Ioannou I. and Serafeim G. (2014) examined through a sample of firms located in 4 
countries (China, Denmark, Malaysia, South Africa), where disclosures were mandated 
prior 2011, the effect of sustainability disclosure regulations on firms’ disclosure policy. 
Mandatory reporting laws and regulations urge companies to improve ESG practices and 
disclosures.    
In another study, Ioannou I. and Serafeim G. (2014) analysed a sample of 3.500 
companies for a time span of 15 years so as to explore the effect of CSR scores on 
analysts’ assessments regarding the firm’s future financial performance. The findings 
indicate that in early 1990s, analysts issued pessimistic recommendations for firms with 
high CSR ratings. This is due to the perception that CSR is more like an agency cost and 
deemed as serving managerial interests rather than shareholders’ objectives.  
However, firms are assessed more optimistically over time and especially by the high-
status analysts. Ioannou I. and Serafeim G. (2014) through their study presumed that 
agency theory was weakened as stakeholder orientation gained momentum by 
investors and analysts. A variety of factors conduced to the agency theory to be 
obsolete, namely NGO activity, SRI, and consumer awareness.     
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2.2 Hypothesis development 
Inferring from the accounting literature, the market valuation of different aspects of 
ESG performance has been under the scope of study of many researchers. The results 
were vague, and the contradictory theories could not prevail over each other. To 
elaborate this view, many of these studies acknowledge the relationship between 
financial performance and environmental performance or between financial 
performance and the employment of corporate governance mechanisms, but they are 
questioning the direction of this relation.  
Extant literature makes inferences about the reverse causality problem on the 
association between firm value and CSR (Waddock & Graves, 1997; Teoh et al., 1999; 
McWilliams & Siegel, 2000; Jiao, 2010).  
Based on empirical evidence of a sample of firms listed on the Stockholm stock 
exchange, Hassel L. et al. (2005) inferred that environmental performance has a negative 
influence on the market value of firms. One possible explanation could be that market 
is short-term oriented and investors punish firms with environmental consciousness. 
Hassel L. et al. (2005) distinguish prior studies at two main streams: the cost-
concerned school and the value creation school. The results of their study evidence that 
environmental investments depict only increased costs which lead to decreased 
earnings and lower market values. Alongside with other research that evidence the 
negative association between environmental performance and market value (Jaggi and 
Freedman, 1992; Walley and Whitehead, 1994). The opposite approach, the value 
creation school, posits that environmental efforts represent a way to gain competitive 
advantage that will improve the shareholders’ returns in the future. The above 
relationship is expected to be positive (Konar and Cohen, 2000; Dowell et al., 2000). 
Do corporations that avoid environmental risks and seize the environmental 
opportunities manage to create shareholder value in the long run? This study focuses 
on the impact of specific dimensions that composes the environmental pillar score 
according to Thomson Eikon database. The effort of companies to reduce resources use, 
such as energy, water, or materials, and instead employing eco-efficient solutions; their 
commitment in reducing environmental emission throughout their operational 
processes; and their innovativeness in designing eco-friendly products and technologies 
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are the three elements that this study examines. Hence, the first hypothesis under 
examination is the following: 
 
Hypothesis 1: The environmental performance of STOXX© Europe 600 index 
components (companies), in terms of resource use, emission and environmental 
innovation, is positively related to their market valuation.  
 
Liao et al. (2015) through their study examining the impact of corporate board’s 
characteristic (gender diversity, board independence, environmental committee) on the 
voluntary disclosure of GHG 15emissions in accordance with the Carbon Disclosure 
Project report, posit that agency theory is inadequate to explain GHG-reporting 
propensity. Stakeholder theory is more valid in explaining the firm’s ability to balance 
financial and non-financial targets and compromise stakeholders with conflicting needs 
through for instance a board with “good governance” traits.   
The second hypothesis development is based on exploring a possible association 
between good corporate governance practices and firm value creation. The goal of CG 
initiatives is to generate shareholder value in the long term through best management 
practices that create incentives at all-organizational levels while safeguarding 
organization’s and investors’ interests. The existence of female directors on the BoD, 
the level of independency on the BoD, the duality of CEO and chairman, the presence of 
corporate governance board committee or the presence of a CSR committee are the 
aspects under examination in value creation for the company.  
 
Hypothesis 2: The corporate governance performance of STOXX© Europe 600 index 
components (companies), in terms of board diversity, board independency, 
CEO/Chairman duality and the existence of CSR or CG committee, is positively related to 
their market valuation. 
 
The third hypothesis focuses on the societal performance of companies and whether 
their actions that have an impact on society, affect the market valuation. The social pillar 
score is comprised of firm’s capability to create trustworthy and loyal relations with its 
workforce, customers, and society. This study examines whether firm’s respect towards 
fundamental human rights conventions, business ethics; firm’s commitment towards 
 
15 GHG – Greenhouse gas emissions  
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protecting public health, producing quality goods and services; and firm’s effectiveness 
towards health, safety and development of its workforce play a vital role in generating 
firm value. 
 
Hypothesis 3: The social performance of STOXX© Europe 600 index components 
(companies), in terms of workforce satisfaction, human rights respect, community 
commitment, and product responsibility is positively related to their market valuation. 
 
This is the first study to our knowledge that examines whether there is a relation 
between the effective tax rate and the environmental, social, or financial performance. 
Tax could be regarded as part of the CSR in the sense that through taxation corporations 
contribute to society. In the context of “good governance” firms ought to establish 
mechanisms integrating responsible tax behaviour and tax transparency. Corporations 
should not only comply with laws and regulations while tax planning, but also not use 
artificial structures that may be legal but unethical. Clotfelter (1985) and Navarro (1988) 
among other researchers, while investigating the topic of corporate philanthropy, 
concentrated on tax law and any applicable provisions for deducting charitable 
contributions. Campbell (2004) admitted that tax law is an important institutional 
mechanism that may cause an impact in corporate behaviour. However, the results are 
inconclusive. The fourth hypothesis examines whether there is any interaction between 
the different aspects of CSR performance measurement and the effective tax rate. A 
high effective tax rate imposed in firms might negatively contribute to their efforts of 
being environmentally and socially responsible.  
 
Hypothesis 4: The environmental and social performance of STOXX© Europe 600 index 
components (companies), is negatively associated with an imposed high effective tax 
rate. 
3. Data and Method 
3.1 Sample selection and data sources 
The STOXX© Europe 600 is a stock index constituted by European stocks. This index 
comprises of a fixed number of 600 components (corporations) stem from 17 European 
countries (Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, 
Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, 
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United Kingdom). The STOXX 600 is deemed for European companies as the equivalent 
of S&P 500, which is for U.S. firms. We considered that we could employ in our sample 
these 600 companies from 10 sectors, because they appear to be large, mid, and small 
capitalization corporations and that would provide variety in our sample.  
The data used in this study were collected from two main sources. Accounting 
information and stock prices were obtained from the Amadeus database. This database 
provides comparable financial data for the largest 550,000 European public and private 
firms. The environmental, social and governance information were gathered from 
Thomson Reuters Refinitiv Eikon. Refinitiv provides ESG scores for more than 10,000 
corporations globally by considering more than 450 ESG metrics. ESG data originate 
from firms’ annual reports, CSR reports, websites, NGO websites and stock exchange 
filings. ESG Combined score (ESGC) is calculated using a subset of 186 metrics under the 
three main pillars: Environmental (resource use, emissions, innovation), Social 
(workforce, human rights, community), Governance (management, shareholders, CSR 
strategy) and Controversies across the main pillars (e.g., scandal, lawsuits, fines, 
legislation disputes).  
 
All financial institutions and financial services, banks, insurance companies and real 
estate are excluded from our sample (namely, financial industry under ICB code 8000) 
due to the special treatment in assets and liabilities of this industry which might impact 
the association between accounting figures and market value (Dahmash et al., 2009). 
Thus, our sample resulted in 456 companies in total. The analysis is under the fiscal years 
2015-2019. Hence, the sub-total initial sample would constitute of 2.280 firm-year 
observations. Companies without complete financial or ESG data either in Amadeus or 
in Thomson Reuters Refinitiv Eikon database were eliminated, which resulted in 1.849 
firm-year observations. Twenty observations were withdrawn due to missing or 
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negative book value of equity, two were eliminated due to missing earnings data and 
lastly, 402 were withdrawn because our sample was unbalanced due to missing years of 
observations for specific firms. The final sample utilized in this research includes 1.429 
firm-year observations (Table 1).  
Table 2 and Table 3 represent the composition of firms per industry and per country, 
respectively in our sample. According to Lund (2007), the energy-intensive sectors are 
basically Oil & Gas, Basic Materials, Industrials and Utilities. Therefore, our sample 
consists of corporations which belong in one of these industries by 44,91%. 
Consequently, our sample appears to be balanced regarding the energy-intensive and 
non-energy-intensive firms. Thus, extreme ESG policies and strategies applicable by 
firms with increased emissions for instance will not drive regression analysis to one or 





3.2 Empirical models 
This study aims to examine whether firm value is affected by the level of firm’s total 
ESG performance, environmental performance and by the use of certain corporate 
governance mechanisms (such as the level of board’s independency, CEO & Chairman 
duality, presence of female executives in BoD, existence of corporate governance 
committee or CSR sustainability committee). This is the first study that considers the 
level of ESG controversies and the impact on firm value. ESG controversies score is based 
on 23 controversy topics that are linked with one dimension of the three main pillars 
(environment, social, governance). A negative event occurred, the bad publicity and the 
media pressure would influence the ESG controversies score and thereafter, the market 
valuation. 
Following extant studies, we employ a linear price-level model that associates the 
firm’s market value of equity (MVE) with its book value of equity (BVE) and earnings per 
share (EPS). This model was used by researchers to test the value relevance of 
environmental performance (such as Hassel et al., 2005) or the value relevance with 
GHG emissions (for instance, Baboukardos & Rimmel, 2014; Siekkinen, 2016; Fazzini and 




MVEit = a0 + a1BVEit + a2EPSit + εit 
 
The above variables are deflated by the number of common shares outstanding 
(Dimitropoulos, Asteriou, Kousenidis and Leventis, 2013). While using a model on a per-
share basis, it is produced less biased and more consistent estimations of coefficients’ 
p-values (Lang, Ready and Wilson, 2006; Barth and Clinch, 2009).  
Moreover, we are using as controls variables: Size, LEV, and Risk. Variable Size is the 
logarithm of total assets and captures the size effects (Berk, 1995). Concerning the level 
of leverage of firms, the result of ratio debt to equity is represented in variable LEV (Lins, 
2003). We use as our last control variable Risk which is proxied by the ratio book to 
market value as Fama and French (1992) suggested. The model is further expanded by 
employing as our main variable of interest ENV_PilScr. Below is presented “Model 1” 
which examines the first hypothesis: 
 
MVEit = a0 + a1BVEit + a2EPSit + a3ENV_PilScrit + a4Sizeit + a5LEVit + a6Riskit + εit (Model.1) 
 
Coefficient a3 estimates the market valuation of environmental performance of 
corporations and is expected to have a positive sign and be significantly different from 
zero. The following modification in “Model 1.i” is as to further investigate the 
dimensions of Environmental Pillar score and detect which of those dimensions play the 
most significant role in firm valuation concerning environmental aspects.  
 
MVEit = a0 + a1BVEit + a2EPSit + a3ResUseit + a4Emsit + a5EnvInvit +a6Sizeit + a7LEVit + a8Riskit + εit 
(Model.1i) 
 
In order to test the second hypothesis, we substitute our main variable of interest 
(ENV_PilScr) with the one stand for the governance evaluation measure (GOV_PilScr) as 
follows:  
 
MVEit = a0 + a1BVEit + a2EPSit + a3GOV_PilScrit + a4Sizeit + a5LEVit + a6Riskit + εit (Model.2) 
 
We, then, modify “Model 2” to examine the five selected criteria (female on BoD, 
independent board members, CSR committee, sustainability committee, CEO/ Chairman 
duality) that impact the result of governance score and derive with the most significant.  
 
MVEit = a0 + a1BVEit + a2EPSit + a3FeBoDit + a4CGCit + a5IndBMsit + a6CEOChSepit + a7CSR_SustComit + 




“Model 3” presents an alteration of the base model, where the main variable of 
interest is the social performance score. It examines the third hypothesis. We expect a 
positive sign and be significantly different from zero.    
 
MVEit = a0 + a1BVEit + a2EPSit + a3SOC_Pilit + a4Sizeit + a5LEVit + a6Riskit + εit (Model.3) 
 
Modification of “Model 3” is employed to examine which among the four dimensions 
(workforce, human rights, community, product responsibility) that formulate the firm’s 
social performance score is driving upwards its market value the most.   
 
MVEit = a0 + a1BVEit + a2EPSit + a3Work_frcit + a4HumRghtsit + a5Cmntit + a6ProdRespit + a7Sizeit + 
a8LEVit + a9Riskit + εit (Model.3i) 
 
To complete the tests for our first three hypotheses, we are going to run a final 
regression analysis using “Model 4” to be ensured that if we add more variables of 
interest in our initial model, will not be altered neither the magnitude nor the 
significance of our results.  
 
MVEit = a0 + a1BVEit + a2EPSit + a3ENV_PilScrit + a4SOC_Pilit + a5GOV_PilScrit + a6ESG_ContrScrit + a7Sizeit 
+ a8LEVit + a9Riskit + εit (Model.4) 
 
Finally, our last model (Model 5) examines the fourth hypothesis. Specifically, we will 
check whether corporations assume high effective tax rate as a deterrent factor while 
implementing initiatives to boost their environmental and social performance. Model 5 
uses an interaction term between ENV_PilScr and ETR, whereas Model 5i uses an 
interaction term between SOC_PilScr and ETR. 
 
MVEit = a0 + a1BVEit + a2EPSit + a3ENV_PilScrit + a4ETRit + a5(ENV_PilScrit x ETRit) + a6Sizeit + a7LEVit + 
a8Riskit + εit (Model.5) 
 
MVEit = a0 + a1BVEit + a2EPSit + a3SOC_PilScrit + a4ETRit + a5(SOC_PilScrit x ETRit) + a6Sizeit + a7LEVit + 
a8Riskit + εit (Model.5i) 
 
4. Findings  
4.1 Data description 
Descriptive statistics for the full sample under examination for all variables used in 
the regression models are presented in Table 4. We have 1.425 firm-year observations 
for the fiscal period of 2015-2019. The average share price of a firm in our sample is  
€ 327,59 which appears to be high and is possibly driven by the extreme share price of 
a particular firm (LINDT & SPRUENGLI REG, €78.607,98). The high standard deviation indicates 
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that the values tend to spread out in a wide range of values, meaning that we have 
extreme values. The negative earnings per share indicate losses for some firms of our 
sample. The variable Loss equals 1 if EPS is negative and we summarize that 87 
observations present negative earnings (only 6% of firms in sample). 
 
Another interesting finding is that the sample composes of exceptionally large as well 
as medium firms considering firm’s total assets. The variable Size is the logarithm of total 
assets, meaning that the smallest firm in our sample has total assets worth € 221,51 
million while the largest has € 578,62 billion in total assets. ROE, as a measure of 
financial performance and profitability of a company, is better comparable among 
peers. For instance, ROE in technology sector (mainly intangible assets) would be 
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relatively higher that in utility sector, which is a sector with many assets and debt. 
Nevertheless, we have an extreme value (RIGHTMOVE GRP, 2.409,90%).   
LEV variable is the ratio debt-to-equity and measures the degree to which a firm 
finances its operations more through debt or equity. The average LEV is less than 1 (0,90) 
meaning that an average firm in our sample is financing its operations marginally mainly 
through its own funds. The average Risk is 0,47 which means that the market value of 
equity is higher than the book value of equity and therefore the company is overvalued, 
which involves higher risk for the investors. Furthermore, there are observations with 
extreme values in effective tax rate (ETR). However, the mean is 31,31% which is rational 
considering that in 2020 the average statutory corporate income tax rate in European 
countries (EU27) is 21,47%, while in OECD countries and the G7 is 23,51% and 24%, 
respectively (Tax Foundation, 2020). 
Concerning the variables of interest, we notice that low average values are detected 
in environmental innovativeness and governance pillar score (below 60). Table 5 
presents the mean values of ESG pillars and dimensions per country.  
 
We may reach several conclusions while interpreting the graphic illustration of Figure 
1, Figure 2, and Figure 3. ESG Combined score is composed by score of 3 pillars 
(environment, social, governance) and ESG controversies. Countries’ average 
environmental score fluctuates between 60 and 70. Only firms in Portugal and Spain 
score higher than 80.  
Denmark, France, Ireland, the Netherlands, and Portugal lack implementation of 
corporate governance mechanisms that would boost the relevant score. The 
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Netherlands’ corporations appear to effectively handle any bad reputation or disputes 
and achieve top score in ESG Controversies. 
Issues associated with Work Force appear to play a vital role for companies 
established in Portugal, Spain, France, Germany, and Italy. Human rights are shielded 
more by firms in Sweden, Denmark, and Portugal in comparison with firms in Italy, 
Austria, and Great Britain. Companies in the Netherlands about the communities within 
they interact, on the contrary with Ireland and Austria showing negligent conduct. 
Companies in France, Italy and Portugal are driven by corporate policies which aim to 
reduce the use of materials, energy, or water. On the opposite, Ireland scores the lowest 
in resource use dimension. Concerning emissions, which deemed as a heavily regulated 
area, we ascertain that firms in Austria, France and Portugal are mindful. Austria’s firms 
attained the highest score in environmental innovation, while companies in most 
countries cannot achieve even a medium score. Nevertheless, we would draw a safer 
conclusion if our sample of firms were more even in terms of number firms per country 
(for instance, Ireland’s ratings are low, but they are based only in 3 firms). 
 
 




 Figure 2: Mean values in Social pillar dimensions (Workforce, Human rights, Community, Product responsibility) per country 
 
 






Over the years, corporations are struggling to improve their ESG performance and 
this fact is depicted in Figure 4. There is an increasing tendency in achieving higher 
ratings in all dimensions during the past 5 fiscal years. It is possible that the diligence 
and perseverance towards this direction may have been accelerated by investors’ 
community pressure or strict regulations. The only area which lacks this upward trend is 
the “ESG Controversies”, which leads to the assumption that scandals, disputes, or 
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Figure 4: Mean values in ESG pillars and dimensions per year  
The energy-intensive sectors (Lund, 2007) present a considerable record of 
achievements in particular ESG areas. For instance, Basic Resources super-sector has the 
highest mean score in community dimension. Construction and Materials super-sector 
has the top value in resources use. Energy sector is cautious about emissions and safety 
on workplace and such conduct is depicted on the relevant mean ratings which exceed 
90.  
On the other side, non-energy-intensive firms concentrate their efforts in conquering 
other areas. For instance, retail sector excels in product responsibility. Automobiles 
sector has the top mean value in environmental and social pillar in respects of 
environmental innovation and human rights, respectively. Among sectors with 
minimum performance in a variety of ESG areas are Travel & Leisure, Technology and 
Telecommunications. Statistics per industry are presented below in Table 7.  
Finally, Table 8 illustrates Pearson’s correlation coefficients for all variables. We 
notice that correlation coefficients among most of the independent variables are much 
less than 0,80 which suggests that there is no multicollinearity obstacle (Gujarity, 1995). 
Nevertheless, results indicate that there are two independent variables with correlation 
coefficients greater than 0,90 which for a conservative party overpass the rule of thumb. 
In other words, BVE and EPS are related themselves as well as with the dependent 
variable, MVE. It is likely to be highly correlated over time for a specific company the 
book to market value. This cross-observation correlation, which is not related to our 
research question, might affect the standard errors of our regression analysis. To resolve 
this problem, we used the well-known "clustered" standard errors, which were 
corrected for unwanted correlation. Using Stata, we could "robust" standard errors to 
be corrected for heteroskedasticity. Then, we clustered the standard errors at firm-level. 
After executing the regression, standard errors have adjusted for 283 clusters in firms. 
The robust option causes the standard errors to consider issues regarding non-normality 
and heterogeneity, while coefficient values remain unchanged and only standard errors 
and t-statistics become different. We run Pearson’s correlation coefficients for all 
variables again and resulted in smaller values than 0,80 for all variables. However, the 
existence of extreme values in MVE in our sample (e.g., LINDT & SPRUENGLI REG, €78.607) affect 
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the regression results. We decided we exclude observations with MVE higher than 400€, 





















4.2 Multivariate analysis 
Table 9 illustrates the results of regressions testing for Hypotheses 1 and 2. Initially, 
a basic model is estimated, where the market value of equity (MVE) is regressed on the 
two basic variables (BVE and EPS) as well as all control variables (Size, LEV, Risk). The 
next columns present the estimated coefficients with the robust standard errors of 
Model 1, 1i, 2 and 2i.  
 To begin with the basic model, there is a positive relationship at 1% significance level 
between the independent variables BVE, Risk and the dependent variable MVE. Another 
interesting finding is that control variables LEV and Risk have the expected signs like Lins 
(2003) and Fama and French (1992), respectively. Specifically, LEV is at 10% level of 
significance negatively associated with MVE (for every unit increase in leverage, 
meaning that firm owe more debt, the market value decreases by € 0,865). Risk 
coefficient stresses out the negative relationship with share price (for every additional 
degree of risk, the market value of equity decreases by 69,56 € on average holding all 
the other variables constant). Size is positively associated with MVE but is not statically 
different from zero. Meaning that one unit increase in the natural logarithm of the size, 
decreases the market value by € 0,10 (9,985/100). Finally, R-squared value: within 
equals 0,2917 which explains how much of the variation in MVE within company units 
is captured by the model. In other words, in our model 29,17% of the variation in MVE 
is explained by the variation in independent variables, leaving 70,83% not explained as 
an error in our model. R-squared between equals 0,5657 meaning that 56,57% of the 
variation in the MVE between company units is captured by our model. In other words, 
the explanatory variables account for differences in MVE between companies at 56,57%.  
Consistent with prior studies, firm’s basic accounting information are positively 
related with market value in all Models (1-5). This finding indicates that BVE has a 
positive effect on the market valuation of companies of STOXX© Europe 600 index. The 
magnitude of the coefficient is around 1 meaning that € 1,00 increase in BVE causes 
approximately € 1,00 increase in share value per price. 
Regarding Model 1, the estimated coefficient of the main variable of interest 
(ENV_PilScr) appears to be positive (0,140) and statistically significant at 10% level. 
Furthermore, we investigate in Model 1i whether environmental dimensions are 
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correlated with market valuation. Resource use, as well as emissions are positively 
associated with MVE at 90% of significance. Environmental innovativeness has no 
significant impact on market valuation based on Model 1i. Thus, we can prove that 
Hypothesis 1 stands, and high environmental performance shall impact the market 
value. Environmental performance is affected especially by two dimensions: the eco-
friendly resource use and the emissions management of firms.  
Based on regression output of Model 2, we find that a high score in governance pillar 
appears to have a positive signed coefficient with a statistically significant effect at 5% 
level on firm value. Further analysis in governance mechanisms (Model 2i), provide us 
with interesting results. Among the corporate governance mechanisms (existence of 
female BoD, independent board members, CEO/ Chairman duality, CSR sustainability 
committee) under examination, we conclude that only CSR_SustCom and FeBoD appear 
to have a positive impact at 5% and 10% significance level, respectively. Basically, 
CSR_SustCom is a binary variable which equals 1 if there is a CSR sustainability 
committee to support BoD functions. Thus, if CSR_SustCom is not zero, then the 
expected market value of equity shall be increased by € 5,186 on average holding all 
other variables constant. FeBoD is a continuous variable which depicts the percentage 
of females in the BoD. An increase in the percentage of FeBoD, may impact the market 
value by an increase of € 18,35.  
   Analysing Model 3, we notice that although social pillar has a positive coefficient 
and is statistically significant at 5% level. Based on Model 3i, we conclude that human 
rights and work force are the two dimensions that boost the relationship between social 
performance and firm value at 5% and 10% level, respectively. Thus, we prove that 
Hypothesis 3 stands. 
As a last resort, we employ Model 4 to examine which of the four elements that 
constitute the ESG Combined Score (environmental, social, governance pillar and ESG 
controversies) may affect the share price more. We conclude that social performance is 
statistically significant at 5% level, while the other three elements are not statistically 
important. 
Finally, the estimated coefficients of Model 5 and Model 5i, in which the interaction 
term “ETRxENV_PilScr” and “ETRxSOC_PilScr” are incorporated respectively, unveil that 
the interaction effect on effective tax rate and environmental or social pilar score is 
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found to be not statistically significant. Furthermore, the effective tax rate appears to 
have no significant impact on market value of equity. Therefore, we reject the 
Hypothesis 4.  
 
5. Conclusions 
The European Commission, among other intermediaries, has been promoting the 
notion of Europe’s markets to work in the direction of sustainable growth. Depicting the 
ranking of “Transparency International’s Corruption Perceptions Index”, EU member 
states were among the least-corrupt nations in 2017.   
The aim of this research covers a wide spectrum of business issues for which more 
light needs to be shed on. Prior research has focused more on the relationship between 
environmental performance, specific corporate governance mechanisms and firm value 
enhancement. This study focused more on sustainability reporting and whether CSR 
scores impact the actual performance of the company. Furthermore, we provide the 
answer whether effective tax rate is another factor which drives managers to avoid 
expenditures in CSR initiatives, which leads in bad CSR performance. The new taxation 
framework that must be adopted by EU Member States (ATAD -CFC rule, GAAR) aims to 
strengthen the protection against aggressive tax planning.  
Utilizing a sample of corporations of STOXX© Europe 600 index for the five-year 
period from 2015 to 2019, we conclude that among all ESG dimensions, there is indeed 
an impact on firm’s market valuation associated with environmental, social and 
governance performance. The level of significance is at 10% for good environmental 
behaviour and more significant at 5% for social and governance performance. However, 
the magnitude of the above relationships is not too important (less than 1€ effect). 
However, two specific corporate governance dimensions, FeBoD and CSR_SustCom are 
both significant and important in magnitude. FeBoD at a 10% significance level causes 
an increase of 18,35€, CSR_SustCom at a 5% significance level causes a positive impact 
of € 5,19 in firm value, while all other independent variables remain constant.  
It should be stressed that this research although studying European accounting data 
in connection with measurements of ESG performance, its regression models did not 
focus on the particularities of different countries or different industries. Therefore, we 
[38] 
 
believe that by enriching the sample and having a more balanced country or/ and 
industry sample, would be a highly interesting future research a cross-country and 
industry comparisons within the EU.  
 We conjecture that the pressure of the markets, investors, and different kind of 
stakeholders for sustainability reporting on behalf of corporations will have an 
ascending tendency. The debate between stakeholder’s theory and agency theory will 
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